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Michio Kaku Imagines ‘The Future of the Mind’

In his new book The Future of the Mind, physicist and futurist Michio Kaku imagines a world where science and science fiction collide. A brain pacemaker for Alzheimer's patients? An Internet of human emotions? Kaku surveys advances in neuroscience that could make these sci-fi dreams a reality.


Produced by Annie Minoff, SciArts Producer
Produced by Becky Fogel, Office Coordinator


GUESTS

Michio Kaku
Author, “The Future of the Mind” (Doubleday, 2014)
Professor of Theoretical Physics, City College and City University of New York
New York, New York

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Cashew

14 Times When Cashew the Guinea Pig Stole the Show on "House Of Cards"


1. When she said “hello” in guinea pig.



2. When Lucas literally could not even handle Cashew’s glory.

I completely understand.


3. When she helped Gavin hack some serious code.



4. And looked fierce as hell doing it.



5. When Gavin was petting her and she was like, I OWN YOU.



6. When Cashew sat on Gavin’s shoulder and made him a better person because of it.



7. When Cashew was much more than a companion, but an actual shoulder to lean on.



8. When Gavin picked Cashew up and looked into her eyes like there was no one else in the world.

No one else matters, really.


9. And Cashew, just by virtue of being Cashew, basically made Gavin fall head over heels in love with her.



10. Like, their love for each other is undeniable and beautiful.

I have no words, just tears of joy.


11. When Cashew had to be in a scene with this royal dickhole.



12. AND SHE ALMOST DIED!



13. When Cashew escaped the shoe of death and ran back to Gavin.

She also made some unbelievably cute guinea pig sounds, just FYI.


14. When Gavin barked like a dog in order to save Cashew’s life.

A Conversation with God

StarTalk Radio Show
with Neil deGrasse Tyson

Neil deGrasse Tyson had the most exclusive interview in the history of StarTalk Radio – a one-on-one conversation with… God. Yes, God. Neil takes full advantage of the opportunity, asking God about everything from evolution and the fossil record to the Big Bang and the possibility of alien life. The two discuss free will, creationism, relativity, quantum physics and string theory. But that’s not all. You’ll find out why God put so many stars in the sky, which extinct animals he misses the most, how many universes there are in the multiverse, and how he was able to stop the sun in the sky for Joshua. More surprisingly, you’ll find out what God thinks of people who kill in his name and how old the universe really is. For these and other divine revelations, this is one episode of StarTalk Radio you can’t afford to miss.



The Graceful Night Sky

Make No Mistake
Credit: Adam Block/Mount Lemmon SkyCenter/University of Arizona
Monday, April 14, 2014: Barred spiral galaxy Messier 91 (M91) lies in the constellation of constellation of Coma Berenices. The galaxy’s bar stands out quite noticeably. The galaxy represents the faintest object in Charles Messier’s catalog, and he discovered it in 1781. Notably, a rare error by Messier caused the galaxy to go “missing” for centuries, until amateur astronomer William C. Williams determined NGC 4548 (catalogued by William Herschel in 1784) was M91 in 1969. Image obtained January-March 2014 by Adam Block and participants of the March 2014 "Astrophotography with Adam" courses.

Such a Delicate Thing
Credit: Solar Dynamics Observatory/NASA
Friday, April 11, 2014: A blob of plasma above the sun underwent twisting and pulling by powerful magnetic forces until the plasma was flung out into space on March 26, 2014. Delicate traces swirled in the wake of the activity. Before the blob broke away, it easily measured larger than several Earths. Solar Dynamics Observatory watched the event in extreme ultraviolet light over about 5.5 hours.

Bar None
Credit: NASA, ESA, and S. Smartt (Queen's University Belfast); Acknowledgement: Brian Campbell
Friday, April 4, 2014: This new Hubble image displays an almost face-on view of the galaxy NGC 1084, a spiral galaxy with no bar-shaped structure of stars at its center. Spiral galaxies lacking a central bar make up about half of all such galaxies. Astronomers have observed five supernova explosions which took place in NGC 1084 over the past half century. The supernova remnants bear names reflecting the year in which they took place:
1963P, 1996an, 1998dl, 2009H and 2012ec.~ Tom Chao

www.space.com

Why does life exist?

Photo credit: Katherine Taylor for Quanta Magazine
Jeremy England, a 31-year-old physicist at MIT, thinks he has found 
the underlying physics driving the origin and evolution of life. 

Quanta Magazine
Natalie Wolchover
Emily Singer contributed reporting. 
January 22, 2014

Popular hypotheses credit a primordial soup, a bolt of lightning and a colossal stroke of luck. But if a provocative new theory is correct, luck may have little to do with it. Instead, according to the physicist proposing the idea, the origin and subsequent evolution of life follow from the fundamental laws of nature and “should be as unsurprising as rocks rolling downhill.”

From the standpoint of physics, there is one essential difference between living things and inanimate clumps of carbon atoms: The former tend to be much better at capturing energy from their environment and dissipating that energy as heat. Jeremy England, a 31-year-old assistant professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has derived a mathematical formula that he believes explains this capacity. The formula, based on established physics, indicates that when a group of atoms is driven by an external source of energy (like the sun or chemical fuel) and surrounded by a heat bath (like the ocean or atmosphere), it will often gradually restructure itself in order to dissipate increasingly more energy. This could mean that under certain conditions, matter inexorably acquires the key physical attribute associated with life.

“You start with a random clump of atoms, and if you shine light on it for long enough, it should not be so surprising that you get a plant,” England said.

England’s theory is meant to underlie, rather than replace, Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, which provides a powerful description of life at the level of genes and populations. “I am certainly not saying that Darwinian ideas are wrong,” he explained. “On the contrary, I am just saying that from the perspective of the physics, you might call Darwinian evolution a special case of a more general phenomenon.”

His idea, detailed in a recent paper and further elaborated in a talk he is delivering at universities around the world, has sparked controversy among his colleagues, who see it as either tenuous or a potential breakthrough, or both.

England has taken “a very brave and very important step,” said Alexander Grosberg, a professor of physics at New York University who has followed England’s work since its early stages. The “big hope” is that he has identified the underlying physical principle driving the origin and evolution of life, Grosberg said.

“Jeremy is just about the brightest young scientist I ever came across,” said Attila Szabo, a biophysicist in the Laboratory of Chemical Physics at the National Institutes of Health who corresponded with England about his theory after meeting him at a conference. “I was struck by the originality of the ideas.”

Others, such as Eugene Shakhnovich, a professor of chemistry, chemical biology and biophysics at Harvard University, are not convinced. “Jeremy’s ideas are interesting and potentially promising, but at this point are extremely speculative, especially as applied to life phenomena,” Shakhnovich said.

England’s theoretical results are generally considered valid. It is his interpretation — that his formula represents the driving force behind a class of phenomena in nature that includes life — that remains unproven. But already, there are ideas about how to test that interpretation in the lab.

“He’s trying something radically different,” said Mara Prentiss, a professor of physics at Harvard who is contemplating such an experiment after learning about England’s work. “As an organizing lens, I think he has a fabulous idea. Right or wrong, it’s going to be very much worth the investigation.”

At the heart of England’s idea is the second law of thermodynamics, also known as the law of increasing entropy or the “arrow of time.” Hot things cool down, gas diffuses through air, eggs scramble but never spontaneously unscramble; in short, energy tends to disperse or spread out as time progresses. Entropy is a measure of this tendency, quantifying how dispersed the energy is among the particles in a system, and how diffuse those particles are throughout space. It increases as a simple matter of probability: There are more ways for energy to be spread out than for it to be concentrated. Thus, as particles in a system move around and interact, they will, through sheer chance, tend to adopt configurations in which the energy is spread out. Eventually, the system arrives at a state of maximum entropy called “thermodynamic equilibrium,” in which energy is uniformly distributed. A cup of coffee and the room it sits in become the same temperature, for example. As long as the cup and the room are left alone, this process is irreversible. The coffee never spontaneously heats up again because the odds are overwhelmingly stacked against so much of the room’s energy randomly concentrating in its atoms.

Although entropy must increase over time in an isolated or “closed” system, an “open” system can keep its entropy low — that is, divide energy unevenly among its atoms — by greatly increasing the entropy of its surroundings. In his influential 1944 monograph “What Is Life?” the eminent quantum physicist Erwin Schrödinger argued that this is what living things must do. A plant, for example, absorbs extremely energetic sunlight, uses it to build sugars, and ejects infrared light, a much less concentrated form of energy. The overall entropy of the universe increases during photosynthesis as the sunlight dissipates, even as the plant prevents itself from decaying by maintaining an orderly internal structure.

Life does not violate the second law of thermodynamics, but until recently, physicists were unable to use thermodynamics to explain why it should arise in the first place. In Schrödinger’s day, they could solve the equations of thermodynamics only for closed systems in equilibrium. In the 1960s, the Belgian physicist Ilya Prigogine made progress on predicting the behavior of open systems weakly driven by external energy sources (for which he won the 1977 Nobel Prize in chemistry). But the behavior of systems that are far from equilibrium, which are connected to the outside environment and strongly driven by external sources of energy, could not be predicted.

This situation changed in the late 1990s, due primarily to the work of Chris Jarzynski, now at the University of Maryland, and Gavin Crooks, now at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. Jarzynski and Crooks showed that the entropy produced by a thermodynamic process, such as the cooling of a cup of coffee, corresponds to a simple ratio: the probability that the atoms will undergo that process divided by their probability of undergoing the reverse process (that is, spontaneously interacting in such a way that the coffee warms up). As entropy production increases, so does this ratio: A system’s behavior becomes more and more “irreversible.” The simple yet rigorous formula could in principle be applied to any thermodynamic process, no matter how fast or far from equilibrium. “Our understanding of far-from-equilibrium statistical mechanics greatly improved,” Grosberg said. England, who is trained in both biochemistry and physics, started his own lab at MIT two years ago and decided to apply the new knowledge of statistical physics to biology.

Using Jarzynski and Crooks’ formulation, he derived a generalization of the second law of thermodynamics that holds for systems of particles with certain characteristics: The systems are strongly driven by an external energy source such as an electromagnetic wave, and they can dump heat into a surrounding bath. This class of systems includes all living things. England then determined how such systems tend to evolve over time as they increase their irreversibility. “We can show very simply from the formula that the more likely evolutionary outcomes are going to be the ones that absorbed and dissipated more energy from the environment’s external drives on the way to getting there,” he said. The finding makes intuitive sense: Particles tend to dissipate more energy when they resonate with a driving force, or move in the direction it is pushing them, and they are more likely to move in that direction than any other at any given moment.

“This means clumps of atoms surrounded by a bath at some temperature, like the atmosphere or the ocean, should tend over time to arrange themselves to resonate better and better with the sources of mechanical, electromagnetic or chemical work in their environments,” England explained.

Self-replication (or reproduction, in biological terms), the process that drives the evolution of life on Earth, is one such mechanism by which a system might dissipate an increasing amount of energy over time. As England put it, “A great way of dissipating more is to make more copies of yourself.” In a September paper in the Journal of Chemical Physics, he reported the theoretical minimum amount of dissipation that can occur during the self-replication of RNA molecules and bacterial cells, and showed that it is very close to the actual amounts these systems dissipate when replicating. He also showed that RNA, the nucleic acid that many scientists believe served as the precursor to DNA-based life, is a particularly cheap building material. Once RNA arose, he argues, its “Darwinian takeover” was perhaps not surprising.

The chemistry of the primordial soup, random mutations, geography, catastrophic events and countless other factors have contributed to the fine details of Earth’s diverse flora and fauna. But according to England’s theory, the underlying principle driving the whole process is dissipation-driven adaptation of matter.

This principle would apply to inanimate matter as well. “It is very tempting to speculate about what phenomena in nature we can now fit under this big tent of dissipation-driven adaptive organization,” England said. “Many examples could just be right under our nose, but because we haven’t been looking for them we haven’t noticed them.”

Scientists have already observed self-replication in nonliving systems. According to new research led by Philip Marcus of the University of California, Berkeley, and reported in Physical Review Letters in August, vortices in turbulent fluids spontaneously replicate themselves by drawing energy from shear in the surrounding fluid. And in a paper appearing online this week in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Michael Brenner, a professor of applied mathematics and physics at Harvard, and his collaborators present theoretical models and simulations of microstructures that self-replicate. These clusters of specially coated microspheres dissipate energy by roping nearby spheres into forming identical clusters. “This connects very much to what Jeremy is saying,” Brenner said.

Besides self-replication, greater structural organization is another means by which strongly driven systems ramp up their ability to dissipate energy. A plant, for example, is much better at capturing and routing solar energy through itself than an unstructured heap of carbon atoms. Thus, England argues that under certain conditions, matter will spontaneously self-organize. This tendency could account for the internal order of living things and of many inanimate structures as well. “Snowflakes, sand dunes and turbulent vortices all have in common that they are strikingly patterned structures that emerge in many-particle systems driven by some dissipative process,” he said. Condensation, wind and viscous drag are the relevant processes in these particular cases.

“He is making me think that the distinction between living and nonliving matter is not sharp,” said Carl Franck, a biological physicist at Cornell University, in an email. “I’m particularly impressed by this notion when one considers systems as small as chemical circuits involving a few biomolecules.”

If a new theory is correct, the same physics it identifies as responsible for the origin of living things could explain the formation of many other patterned structures in nature. Snowflakes, sand dunes and self-replicating vortices in the protoplanetary disk may all be examples of dissipation-driven adaptation.
England’s bold idea will likely face close scrutiny in the coming years. He is currently running computer simulations to test his theory that systems of particles adapt their structures to become better at dissipating energy. The next step will be to run experiments on living systems.

Prentiss, who runs an experimental biophysics lab at Harvard, says England’s theory could be tested by comparing cells with different mutations and looking for a correlation between the amount of energy the cells dissipate and their replication rates. “One has to be careful because any mutation might do many things,” she said. “But if one kept doing many of these experiments on different systems and if [dissipation and replication success] are indeed correlated, that would suggest this is the correct organizing principle.”

Brenner said he hopes to connect England’s theory to his own microsphere constructions and determine whether the theory correctly predicts which self-replication and self-assembly processes can occur — “a fundamental question in science,” he said.

Having an overarching principle of life and evolution would give researchers a broader perspective on the emergence of structure and function in living things, many of the researchers said. “Natural selection doesn’t explain certain characteristics,” said Ard Louis, a biophysicist at Oxford University, in an email. These characteristics include a heritable change to gene expression called methylation, increases in complexity in the absence of natural selection, and certain molecular changes Louis has recently studied.

If England’s approach stands up to more testing, it could further liberate biologists from seeking a Darwinian explanation for every adaptation and allow them to think more generally in terms of dissipation-driven organization. They might find, for example, that “the reason that an organism shows characteristic X rather than Y may not be because X is more fit than Y, but because physical constraints make it easier for X to evolve than for Y to evolve,” Louis said.

“People often get stuck in thinking about individual problems,” Prentiss said.  Whether or not England’s ideas turn out to be exactly right, she said, “thinking more broadly is where many scientific breakthroughs are made.”

Jimmy Slyde



Amore

AP Photo

ellievhall buzzfeed.com

(ANSA) - Milan, January 29 - Pope Francis blessed and took into his hands a green parrot that belonged to a former male stripper during his general audience on Wednesday. The parrot's owner thought it best to admit he was the bird's proud father after press reports saying it belonged to a traveling circus from northern Italy. "It was fun," Francesco Lombardi, the former stripper known as Ghyblj, told ANSA. "A sort of mixing of the holy and the profane. I am a world champion stripper and have the leading role in (erotic filmmaker) Tinto Brass's next movie". Lombardi, who has also been the head of the town council of Trezzano, near Milan, said he had come to Rome with his wife and two daughters to attend the general audience, bringing with him the parrot named 'Amore' ('Love'). "Pope Francis, who I am in love with," he said, "called it 'a beautiful gift from God'".


AP Photo

AP Photo

Games of Truth

Social Media Serve as a Staging Ground for Wars of Authenticity
By ROB HORNING

Foucault’s last two lecture series at the Collège de France, in 1982-83 and 1983-84—published in English as The Government of Self and Others and The Courage of the Truth—offer a series of interpretations of ancient Greek texts to examine the relation of the “self” to public truth-telling. What did it mean to “know thyself,” as the Delphic oracle advised? What procedures guaranteed the truth of such knowledge? And why would telling the truth about the self be a precondition for having a self in the first place? Here’s how Foucault describes what he hoped to do in these lectures (poignantly slipping into the subjunctive; he knew he wouldn't get the project finished):

“What I would like to recover is how truth-telling, in this ethical modality which appeared with Socrates right at the start of Western philosophy, interacted with the principle of existence as an oeuvre to be fashioned in all its possible perfection, how the care of self, which, in the Greek tradition long before Socrates, was governed by the principle of a brilliant and memorable existence, [...] was not replaced but taken up, inflected, modified, and re-elaborated by the principle of truth-telling that has to be confronted courageously, how the objective of a beautiful existence and the task of giving an account of oneself in the game of truth were combined …

The emergence of the true life in the principle and form of truth-telling (telling the truth to others and to oneself, about oneself and about others), of the true life and the game of truth-telling, is the theme, the problem that I would have liked to study” [Feb. 29, 1984, lecture].

I’ve bolded the parts that jumped out at me in that passage, the ones that reminded me of social-media practice. The archive social media compiles of us could be seen as an “oeuvre to be fashioned in all its possible perfection”; it allows us to live with that ideal of the self as a kind of artwork much more concretely in mind. Social media also give us an opportunity to “confront courageously” the principles of truth-telling—how much to share, with whom, and with how much concern for our and others’ privacy—that are activated by the various platforms.

According to Foucault, that aim of living a “beautiful existence” has not been traditionally understood as something that can be achieved through a passive documentation of what we’ve done—escaping reflexivity does not make life more beautiful or pure, as those who make a fetish of spontaneity insist. Instead, he argues that the “beautiful existence” came to hinge on playing “games of truth” that reveal the self to itself, as courageous.

The “true life,” then, is not given automatically to ordinary people as a reward for their ordinariness. We too must prove our lives are true, are real, are legitimate, to the audiences we marshal on social media. That is, we must demonstrate the productive value of our uniquely wrought subjectivity to garner social recognition; we have to build the community (that once was a geographical given) as an online audience and hold it together by performing for it perpetually. The truth test becomes a way to ascertain one’s own reality, to register a “true” or “real” self that exists apart from the flux of contingencies that seem to shape us in real time. A self is not a sum of content; a self is a practice.

But what is that “productive value”? What sort of performances, or “games of truth,” reveal it? How is it translated into status? What defines that “truth”? How does our notion of the truth about the self modulate to fit the sorts of truths social media are optimized to confirm and disseminate? When does “sharing”—adding to collective knowledge—become “trolling,” a zero-sum challenge over who can control what is regarded as the truth? Is there anyway to keep those concepts cleanly separated?

At the very least, these questions help reframe social media use—sometimes dismissed as merely narcissistic attention-seeking—as the attempt to live the truth courageously in a perpetual provocation of others, in the mode of the ancient Cynics. The Delphic oracle told Diogenes of Sinope not to “know thyself” but to “deface the currency.” What are our social media platforms asking us to do?

Throughout the lectures, Foucault is chiefly concerned with the concept of parrhesia, a mode of plain-speaking truth marked by provocation. It signals an individual’s willingness to tell the truth as that individual perceived it, with a minimum of rhetorical flourish, in the face of whatever customary, tactical, or ideological “truths” might be circulating at a given moment and whatever force might be deployed to suppress dissenting views.

Because it is already supposed to be direct, “natural,” and without figure, parrhesia’s “truth” is not measured in terms of its clarity or fidelity to what it represents. Truth is not a matter of facticity. Instead, parrhesia indexes the truth content in an utterance to the risk incurred in speaking it. In the following passage, from the February 1, 1984, lecture, Foucault contrasts the parrhesiast with the “technician” or teacher, for whom truth is indexed to “filiation,” the way speaking can build a relationship through shared knowledge:

We have seen that the parrhesiast, to the contrary, takes a risk. He risks the relationship he has with the person to whom he speaks. And in speaking the truth, far from establishing this positive bond of shared knowledge, heritage, filiation, gratitude, or friendship, he may instead provoke the other’s anger, antagonize an enemy, he may arouse the hostility of the city, or, if he is speaking the truth to a bad and tyrannical sovereign, he may provoke vengeance and punishment. And he may go so far as to risk his life, since he may pay with his life for the truth he has told. Whereas, in the case of the technician’s truth-telling, teaching ensures the survival of knowledge, the person who practices parrhesia risks death. The technician’s and teacher’s truth-telling brings together and binds; the parrhesiast’s truth-telling risks hostility, war, hatred, and death. And if the parrhesiast’s truth may unite and reconcile, when it is accepted and the other person agrees to the pact and plays the game of parrhesia, this is only after it has opened up an essential, fundamental, and structurally necessary moment of the possibility of hatred and a rupture.

Truth, if parrhesia is the reigning modality for it, is a matter of breaking relationships, not building them. That power, that risk, marks its truth as authentic. The speech that builds relationships is merely practical or performative. The merely performative, Foucault suggests, does not constitute the self so much as reaffirm pre-existing status—the ability to make a performance and have it be understood by the audience as such. Parrhesia, however, “is a way of opening up this risk linked to truth-telling by, as it were, constituting oneself as the partner of oneself when one speaks, by binding oneself to the statement of the truth and to the act of stating the truth.”

That is to say, parrhesiastic discourse can posit a claim to having a self rather than draw on an already established one—it depends on the act of speaking out not from behind the mask of a particular social role one has adopted but as one’s bare self. The plain speaking retroactively makes the speaker naked. And that retroactive attribution is made possible by the riskiness of what’s been said.

If, as Foucault notes, parrhesiac statements must be loaded with enough affect to make auditors potentially kill over them, then one has to have some extremely intense material to talk about in order to become a self in this fashion. Cultivating a “true” self through parrhesia thus means cultivating confrontational or controversial things to say, and access to audiences that will be startled or affronted by them. One must seek out “explosive truth” about the world or about others, or contrive situations to be able to manufacture such potent truths. Such drama-laden public scenarios give people a chance to speak “risky” truths and thereby substantiate their committed integrity and develop status, rather than merely draw on pre-existing status to make public “performances.”

Performance reinforces the sanctity of the truth-telling scene as it has already been set up socially, with all the roles established and agreed upon by all the actors. Authority is pre-distributed and then reinscribed by what the performers say. Performance’s purpose is to rearticulate the status quo rather than challenge it. Though it can sometimes appear that revealing the “natural order” to be nothing more than a set of performances will destabilize and undermine that order, the fact that performances get naturalized isn’t the sole source of their power. The investment in making a performance, the skills one hones for it, can make it more binding, more coercive, harder to conceive of discarding. The unscripted alternative can appear to be chaos.

Parrhesia draws its power, its air of truth, from that chaos. It attempts to undo established roles in part through the force of exposure. One makes statements meant to reveal how people “really” are and recast their adoption of roles as hypocrisy. Parrhesia bases its claim to truth in pointing behind the curtain and revealing how many masks are being worn. (Erving Goffman describes several tactics for this disruption of “front region control” in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.)

Exposing the “inauthenticity” of the powerful in this way doesn't automatically nullify their power, but the force of parrhesia depends on asserting that it should. Such discourse propounds that it is better, more truthful, to see past the performativity that sustains the existing order, even if what lies beyond it is the void. In the January 12, 1983, lecture, Foucault says,

In a performative utterance, the given elements of the situation are such that when the utterance is made, the effect which follows is known and ordered in advance, it is codified, and this is precisely what constitutes the performative character of the utterance. In parrhesia, on the other hand, whatever the usual, familiar, and quasi-institutionalized character of the situation in which it is effectuated, what makes it parrhesia is that the introduction, the irruption of the true discourse determines an open situation, or rather opens the situation and makes possible effects which are, precisely, not known.

“Parrhesia does not produce a codified effect,” Foucault says. “It opens up an unspecified risk.” In contemporary terms, this might be seen as the troll’s wager, typically offered from behind a cloak of anonymity.

In subsequent lectures, Foucault links parrhesia to Cynicism, an ancient mode of ur-trolling. As Foucault’s March 14, 1984, lecture discusses, ancient Cynics in Greece liked to rub the public’s noses in humankind’s animal nature and tried to live a “true life” through rejecting all social conventions in the most public way they could manage—to “live the truth” through unrelenting public self-documentation.

Cynic courage of the truth consists in getting people to condemn, reject, despise, and insult the very manifestation of what they accept, or claim to accept at the level of principles. It involves facing up to their anger when presenting them with the image of what they accept and value in thought, and at the same time reject and despise in their life … In the case of Cynic scandal—and this is what seems to me to be important and worth holding on to, isolating—one risks one’s life, not just by telling the truth, and in order to tell it, but by the very way in which one lives. In all the meanings of the word, one “exposes” one’s life. That is to say, one displays it and risks it. One risks it by displaying it; and it is because one displays it that one risks it. One exposes one’s life, not through one’s discourses, but through one’s life itself.

Talking is not enough; it must be elevated to a display of a way of life. You know you are living the truth if others regard you as a scandal. The analogy to social media seems almost self-evident. They permit us to make self-documentation a form of confrontation, not idle self-centered chatter.

Foucault explains how cynical practice pushes honor and truth-telling to an extreme at which its radical honesty becomes indistinguishable from a “shameless life”: “The kunikos life is a dog’s life in that it is without modesty, shame, and human respect,” Foucault says. “It is a life which does in public, in front of everyone, what only dogs and animals dare to do, and which men usually hide.” Offering that visceral personal stake itself—opening oneself to humiliation—is key; the exposure must be intrinsically inseparable from the deed. Social media work just like that, making all exposures deeds and vice versa.

Social media concretizes that gaze of others necessary to live the ethical, dog’s life—the true life under watchful gaze of the scandalized masses. Foucault stresses that everyday life in all its banality must be observed and judged for the Cynic’s approach to truth to succeed.

For the Cynics, the rule of non-concealment is no longer an ideal principle of conduct, as it was for Epictetus or Seneca. It is the shaping, the staging of life in its material and everyday reality under the real gaze of others, of everyone else, or at any rate of the greatest possible number of others. The life of the Cynic is unconcealed in the sense that it is really, materially, physically public.

So all those photos of food, all those indiscreet selfies, have an ethical function. “There is no privacy, secret, or non publicity in the Cynic life,” Foucault says, and that sounds pretty familiar—like a lot of the complaints about ubiquitous social media. But contrary to what many current critics say about social media’s inauthenticity, this is not performance, in Foucault’s terms, but parrhesia. Mistaking it as strategic playacting oversimplifies what is happening.

Typically social-media use is seen as identity or reputation construction, narrating cultural capital into existence. But “exposing” life is not always the same as making an identity, in the sense of building a reputation. It can also be a way to subordinate or even sacrifice reputation for truth: Sharing can be a matter of volunteering the self for ridicule, purging, nullification, ritual flaying—self-branding of a different kind. It’s why people sign up for demeaning reality TV shows, as Wayne Koestenbaum suggests in Humiliation. It’s part of why we sign up for Facebook. Moments of humiliation, Koestenbaum notes, “may be execrable and unendurable” but are also “genuine” in a “world that seems increasingly filled with fakeness.” Social media neatly increase that feeling of the world’s phoniness while providing a means for the sort of self-exposure that combats it. As more behavior seems inauthentic and “performative,” we have greater need to expose ourselves and have our own authenticity vindicated through the embarrassment this causes us.

This can be seen as a fulfillment of the Cynic’s injunction to “alter the currency.” Foucault emphasizes the ambiguity and open-ended potential of this ongoing demand to “revalue” value, including that of attention. Social-media use is a way of continually modulating attention’s value according to whether it feels more sustaining to spend it or be ravished and affirmed by it. One can gain illusory control over whether one is the subject granting attention or the object receiving it, when we are always both—never more so than within social media. “Within the accepted humiliation,” Foucault claims, “one is able to turn the situation around, as it were, and take back control of it.”

Social media, by offering the dog’s life, afford a straightforward route to integrity—or at least to how the cynics saw integrity. Foucault says that “the Cynic dramatization of the unconcealed life therefore turns out to be the strict, simple, and, in a sense, crudest possible application of the principle that one should live without having to blush at what one does, living consequently in full view of others and guaranteed by their presence.” That is reminiscent of Mark Zuckerberg’s comments about integrity, or Google CEO Eric Schmidt’s comment that “if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to be afraid of.” Using proprietary tech platforms to conduct your ascetic radical disclosure and unveil your latent integrity just happens to be highly lucrative for tech companies.

But because the parrhesiac self hinges on daring gestures rather than stable reputability, it also offers people the feeling of integrity within anonymity. Social media stage networked confrontations as discrete moments of truth, linking the sense of self in the moment with the shame created for oneself or another, and not with an ongoing branded personal identity.

In trying to uncloak life and expose truth, parrhesia may be likened to transgressive art practice, another tried and true mode of trolling. In the February 29, 1984, lecture, Foucault connects performance to “the consensus of culture” and parrhesia to art:

The consensus of culture has to be opposed by the courage of art in its barbaric truth. Modern art is Cynicism in culture; the cynicism of culture turned against itself. And if this is not just in art, in the modern world, in our world, it is especially in art that the most intense forms of a truth-telling with the courage to take the risk of offending are concentrated.

That is almost a truism, that artists “take risks” and tell untoward truths that ordinary culture refuses to express or tries to conceal. Artists become society’s conscience. Whether or not that’s true, social media, by democratizing parrhesia, democratize the opportunity to conceive of oneself as an artist in that way, someone whose life itself is a critical practice and an expression of beautiful truth, without having to sustain a marketable reputation to make a living as an artist.

Not everyone using social media, obviously, is a Cynic or a confrontational artist (at least not all the time). Most of online communication is conventionally performative (reiterating pre-existing status and stable emotional bonds—routinely liking the status updates of friends and “keeping in touch”) if not phatic (simply announcing one’s existence, in a kind of mic check). People using Facebook are not risking very much—not enough to keep them from using the site to try to help manage their general anxiety about social inclusion. But at some level users likely believe that they are transforming their lives into an “artwork” worthy of an audience by using social media, and that the platforms encourage them to believe they can and should systematically enlarge the audience that their “brilliant and memorable existence” is appropriate for. At first, friends. Then “Friends”—people you know only in social-media networks. Then, anyone with enough Friends in common.

In this way, Facebook use begins to bleed over into the sort of social-media interaction that is more unpredictable in the ways that Foucault is outlining with respect to parrhesia, and thus more compulsive, more addictive. Whereas performative discourse takes the self as static and the exchanges it generates as predictable, socially scripted, parrhesia puts the self into play, makes it a stake in an unpredictable game, makes it growable. Parrhesia underwrites the slot-machine-like aspects of seeking unanticipated microaffirmation through social media, of trying for jackpot “virality” that suddenly swells the self by broadening its circulation in the network. The hoard of inner experience—turned into signifiers of the self in the social-media system—then takes on more weight, feels more substantial for the duration of that viral flare. One’s online archive, the whole of one’s time line, suddenly seems relevant, in play. It might even seem more true, a prelude to destiny.

Since parrhesia is where the compulsion is, social media platforms may be engineered to simulate it: They can be designed to stimulate drama and confrontation (Twitter fights, flame wars—remember those?—and context collapses, etc.) as well as the routine performative grooming of established bonds. Often these confrontations play on the status asymmetry of the parties involved; social media, by bringing people of varying status together in the same discursive space, set the stage for “games of truth.” Foucault argues that for parrhesia to be possible, there needs to be a tyrant who has power over you that you are addressing to establish the stakes, the danger. By taking down that tyrant in a public forum—and social media have become well suited to accommodating this—one secures one’s own relationship to “truth”; one wins the prize of authenticity.

But by making audiences more readily available and making some forms of self-documentation more automatic, social media lower the costs of the intentionality that makes confrontation and self-witnessing critical, constitutive of a courageous self. How much risk is left in it when it is automatic, ubiquitous, anonymous? The platforms capitalize on the frisson of courage and risk to make using social media more compulsive while containing parrhesia’s subversive potential. Anonymous trolls are usually policing existing inequalities—bullying women off the Internet, for instance—as they secure a sense of self through confrontation.

The phrase “game of truth” points to the idea that authenticity does not simply exist but is made. Parrhesia is not about expressing any kind of “objective” truth at all: “The statement of the truth,” Foucault notes, “does not open up any risk if you envisage it only as an element in a demonstrative procedure.” Instead, it hinges on offending or troubling others perceived to have higher status in their sense of who they are: “the person who tells the truth throws the truth in the face of his interlocutor, a truth which is so violent, so abrupt, and said in such a peremptory and definitive way that the person facing him can only fall silent, or choke with fury, or change to a different register,” Foucault explains. Parrhesia can thus be seen as a kind of privilege shaming, a “speaking truth to power”—with power being not merely a matter of the explicit power to dominate over others but also the power to constitute oneself in a publicly credible way, the power of habitus, the power to make and control the knowledge about oneself rather that being subject to others’ determination, as mere information. But this also means parrhesia can be a matter of protecting privilege from the “threats” represented by the points of view of excluded others. In the fun-house mirror of ressentiment, harassment becomes ethical self-defense.

The resulting confrontations are usually zero-sum: Autonomy over one’s identity, in the “game of parrhesia,” is at the expense of the person you confront. The truth-teller gains agency over it that they see as measurable only in terms of the target’s loss of security. You know you have succeeded in telling truths (and gained status or ontological stability) only if the other is discomfited, thrown into confusion.

To argue that people jeopardize their “real” self by using social media performatively (self-promoting, posturing, etc.) is to try to stage a truth game, to interpolate people into an authenticity competition. That argument takes people’s ordinary discourse online and scrutinizes it as failed parrhesia. Social media make targets accessible and supply flash audiences to watch any confrontation that can be drummed up. This means we are also inadvertently on the battle field. The challenge can come at any time: I’m still real, are you?

Denying others the right to exist in different contexts, to have different social roles, is always an option available to “trolls” and other people seeking to garner a stronger sense of self. Staging a context collapse starts a truth game that the lower-status person has everything to gain by and relatively little to lose.

Parrhesia in social media yields a self moored by zero-sum games of power and delineated by measurable evidence of influence. This seemingly stable set of procedures for making a self—for playing the game of truth—are the consolation for the dismal, anxious, hyperreflexive sort of self the procedures actually yield. It may be that the only thing more intolerable than an “inauthentic” self is being at a loss for coherent procedures for “growing the self.” Of course, that anxiety can be historicized as being a reflection of neoliberalism, and of the need to be entrepreneurial about one’s personal brand to survive.

Social media provide the sort of metrics to make the game of parrhesia more playable, more creditable—they give a scoreboard for the sort of ethos that emerges from truth games—but these same metrics might also help keep parrhesia at bay by revealing status and allowing high-status people to avoid interaction with lower-status people. Accusations of inauthenticity may be simply irrelevant when cast at elites whose massive fame (or wealth) insulates them from ontological insecurity. It may be that social media facilitate not a confrontation of high against low, but of low against lower in a perpetual unfolding of petty drama in social media, to the social-media companies’ benefit, while the high-status people remain exempt, manifesting in social media mainly to perform their essential inaccessability.

The potential for parrhesia in social media is thereby circumscribed by some of the same affordances that make the parrhesia possible. Worse, the parrhesia in social media may set individuals against one another in pointless struggles for authenticity while precluding them from uniting politically to fight for shared goals against those remote elites. The satisfaction of those games, the “self” and “truth” that emerges from those compulsions, is another species of “cruel optimism,” to use Lauren Berlant’s phrase, in that it offers formal rituals that make the present tolerable or even pleasurable while altering nothing about a general condition that makes people feel overburdened, depressed, precarious, excluded, humiliated. There is a pale satisfaction in making a limited truth in the moment, even if it has no effect on the distribution of power or the way one is known by society.